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This thesis examines the role of alternative development in the Colombian 
and U.S. governments’ counter drug strategies.  Both governments include 
alternative development as a part of their policies, but provide limited funding to 
the programs when compared to the funding for forced eradication and security 
measures.  Existing policies have produced reductions in drug cultivation in many 
areas and the Colombian government has made gains in security throughout the 
country, particularly the remote rural regions.  These gains make conditions in 
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increased funding.  Both governments are addressing components of successful 
alternative development programs, but funding disparities are hindering the 
effectiveness of the programs.  While the international and European 
communities are staunch supporters of alternative development, the funding 
provided by them has been limited in scope because of disagreement with the 
U.S.-backed eradication policies.  The U.S. and Colombian governments in 
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The Colombian conflict over drugs and territorial control is devastating in 
its impact on the civilian population and has become a crisis in the eyes of the 
world.  By the 1990s a significant growth in coca production took place because 
of the decline of plantations in Bolivia and Peru brought about by eradication and 
alternative development efforts.  Illicit crops found ideal conditions in the 
peripheral areas of the Colombian countryside where there was a low level of 
state presence and a social base in the form of the campesino settlers.   
Throughout the 1980s, armed actors in the Colombian countryside had 
been involved in the drug trade, but the increase in coca cultivation in the 1980s 
would lead to an escalation of the conflict between these actors.  The drug-
traffickers, who slowly became landowners, contributed to the creation of 
paramilitary groups and established a significant presence in the countryside 
during the 1980s.  The phenomenon began to extend as groups appeared such 
as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which was formed as an 
umbrella group for paramilitaries from across the country.  The expansion of illicit 
crops also led to the transformation of the relationship between the guerrillas and 
drug trafficking.  At the beginning, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) limited itself to regulating relations between the campesino coca growers 
and the drug traffickers, but gradually became more involved in levying tax on the 
crops, and later the production and even trafficking of coca.  The income derived 
from illicit crops increased the FARC’s autonomy, as the group no longer had to 
depend on its integration into the rural communities. 
The defeat of the Medellín and Cali cartels in the mid-1990s by the 
Colombian government allowed insurgent and paramilitary groups to expand 
their participation in the drug business, precisely at the moment when coca 
cultivation was shifting into Colombia.  The conflict over land became more 
intense as the insurgents and paramilitaries jockeyed for control of the coca- and 
opium-producing territories and the income they produced.  The violence 
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decimated the rural population and forced many farmers to flee their land.  The 
inability of the state to control this conflict and protect the peasants of rural 
Colombia has contributed to a crisis of legitimacy of the political regime.  In the 
absence of the state, violence has become the mechanism for the resolution of 
private and collective conflicts in the countryside.  
In sum, the struggle between the paramilitaries and guerrillas for control 
over lands devoted to coca cultivation since the mid 1990s has contributed to the 
undermining of the legitimacy of the Colombian state, especially in the 
countryside where the state has been unable to protect its citizens’ lives, and an 
explosion in coca production.  Many different combinations of policies have been 
advocated as a solution to Colombia’s problems.  This thesis attempts to 
understand the role that alternative development strategies might play in any 
solution to the problems of drugs and rural violence in Colombia.    This has been 
a particularly controversial issue in U.S.-European relations, with the countries of 
the European Union sharply criticizing U.S. assistance to Colombia for its 
insistence on forced eradication and military interdiction of drugs.  European 
countries, in contrast, advocate economic and social programs as the main 
remedy for the explosion of coca cultivation and the delegitimization of the state 
in the countryside.   
Chapter II evaluates the role that alternative development plays within 
Colombia’s current strategy, backed by the U.S., to regain control of the 
insurgent-occupied areas of the country and reduce coca and opium production.  
It finds that there have been many gains made since the introduction of Plan 
Colombia in 1999 under President Carlos Pastrana and Colombian President 
Álvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy in 2003, not only in the 
realm of drug eradication, but also in terms of state consolidation and security.  
But are the governments of Colombia and the United States taking advantage of 
the opportunities presented by these gains?  This chapter argues that alternative 
development is necessary to consolidate the gains made in the eradication of 
coca and the establishment of state legitimacy in the countryside.  While recent 
Colombian government policies explicitly address alternative development, Plan 
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Colombia fails to provide adequate funding for it to be effective and the Defense 
Policy subordinates it to security concerns. 
A small percentage of the multi-billion dollar Plan Colombia aid package 
from the U.S. has gone toward alternative development programs.  This 
disparate ratio indicates that the importance is being placed on eradication rather 
than economic and social development.  Similarly, Colombian President Uribe’s 
Defense Policy chooses to attack the problem of security before shifting the 
focus onto alternative development.  However, the success of eradication 
programs creates a segment of the rural population that must find a new way to 
make a living.  These farmers may not initially have been in the rural labor 
market and either need training and education to reenter the formal work force or 
should be given a viable crop substitute on which they can subsist. 
Chapter III seeks to understand the components that make alternative 
development programs successful and attempts to determine whether those 
components exist in Colombia.  It finds that Colombia has made significant 
efforts to incorporate many of the ingredients necessary for a successful 
alternative development program into their drug control strategy with the 
continued support of the United States, but international support is just as vital to 
success.   
Forced eradication efforts have been denigrated by the international 
community, but are indeed necessary to give illicit farmers an incentive to 
participate in alternative development.  Other ingredients such as improved 
monitoring and evaluation of programs, clear government commitment to 
alternative development, viable replacement crops and markets for those crops, 
and improved social infrastructure are needed to make alternative development 
successful.  While some of these are being incorporated into the Colombian and 
U.S. government strategies, the ingredients that are needed to further the 
successes realized by the eradication efforts are being grossly under funded. 
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Finally, Chapter IV evaluates the extent to which the international 
community and the European community have implemented the kinds of trade 
policies and financial support programs necessary for alternative development to 
succeed in Colombia.  Colombia is reaching out to the international community 
for economic assistance not only in the form of aid packages and loans, but also 
through preferential trade agreements and Free Trade Areas (FTA).  Bilateral 
agreements have been made with numerous countries and the on-going Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations, while stalled in general, are 
generating strong regional support and solidarity.  The European Union has 
maintained preferential trade arrangements with Colombia for many years and is 
even looking to expand their trade in conjunction with continued financial support 
for economic and social development. 
Many international organizations are also lending support to Colombia.  
The United Nations is orchestrating numerous projects to build infrastructure and 
help farmers move away from the illicit crop industry.  The Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank have also provided financial 
assistance to Colombia primarily for rural development.  Along with these 
measures, the gains in security realized under President Uribe have led to much 
improved economic growth in the country. 
 Despite this level of support, current alternative development programs 
and initiatives in Colombia need to be increasingly funded and supported as an 
integral element of resolving the illicit drug problem and reconstructing 
democratic stability.  The concluding chapter argues that Colombia, the United 
States, and the international community should focus more on alternative 
development to achieve democratic security.  By continuing alternative 
development programs in Colombia it may make regaining control of occupied 








II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT: 
THE U.S. AND COLOMBIAN ERADICATION AND SECURITY 
STRATEGIES, 1999-2004 
Drugs and armed actors are arguably at the root of Colombia’s problems.  
The government faces three sets of armed actors recognized as terrorists by the 
United States -- the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known in 
Spanish as FARC), the left-wing National Liberation Army (ELN), and the right-
wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) – which operate in areas of 
the country where the government presence is weak.  Fueling the conflict 
between the government and the guerrillas, and between the FARC and AUC 
themselves, is the drug industry.  The FARC and AUC are warring over control of 
lands where coca is cultivated and drugs are trafficked, while the government is 
attempting to eradicate illicit crops and regain control of the countryside.  Caught 
in the middle of the violence are the citizens of Colombia.  Specifically, the 
farmers who grow the coca and poppies are faced with forced eradication of their 
only income source by the government on one side, and coercion and even more 
violence from the armed factions on the other.   
Given the centrality of drugs to the armed conflict in Colombia, many 
observers have advocated drug control policies as part of the solution to the 
country’s political violence, but have often disagreed over what kinds of counter-
drug policies should be promoted.  Some observers have stressed the centrality 
of alternative development as part of the solution to the conflict in Colombia.  In 
contrast, the Colombian and U.S. governments have focused on the need for 
forced eradication of coca and the establishment of state control over the 
countryside as necessary prerequisites to alternative development programs. 
This chapter describes Colombian government policies over the past six 
years and the levels of U.S. funding for these policies and evaluates the extent to 
which these policies have laid the groundwork for alternative development. 
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Introduced during Colombian President Carlos Pastrana’s administration 
(1998-2002), Plan Colombia has the framework, and U.S. financial support, 
needed to provide economic development, enhance political stability, increase 
domestic security, and reduce drug production and trafficking.  However, the 
disparate distribution of funds in favor of forced eradication suggests that 
economic reforms are believed to be of lesser importance to achieving the 
ultimate goal of a secure state.  The Democratic Security and Defense Policy, 
written and unveiled by Colombia’s new President Álvaro Uribe in 2003, 
reemphasizes the need for the Colombian government to regain control of the 
country, but places the onus on the citizens to help reestablish security in remote 
areas.  Both Plan Colombia and the Democratic Security and Defense Policy 
assert that security and drug eradication are paramount goals.  The question of 
what to do with the farmers whose crops are eradicated is answered in the form 
of alternative development, albeit sparingly in both documents.   
The chapter begins by examining the genesis of the violence and security 
problem in Colombia because this is important to understanding the strategies 
adopted by the U.S. and Colombian governments.  The conflict between the 
FARC and AUC and the Colombian government over land control and drug 
cultivation prompted the drafters of Plan Colombia and the Democratic Security 
and Defense Policy to outline strategies that it is hoped will engender a resolution 
to the problem.  This chapter shows that government policies have led to certain 
successes in the areas of drug eradication and the establishment of security in 
the country. 
 
A. DRUGS AND ARMED ACTORS 
Drug trafficking in Colombia has directly contributed to increasing levels of 
violence since the mid-1990s, the destabilization of the democratic government, 
and the weakening of the economy.  Drug production and trafficking provides 
approximately $1 billion per year to illegal armed factions in Colombia.1  The 
 
1 Center for Defense Information, “In The Spotlight: Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia,” CDI Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/farc.cfm; 
Internet; accessed 14 June 2004. 
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FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) alone is reported to have 
made over $700 million per year from drugs and kidnappings.2  The AUC (United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) earns approximately $300 million per year and 
70% of that comes from drugs, according to its founder Carlos Castaño.  These 
well-financed narco-terrorists pose a significant threat to U.S. interests in 
Colombia and the stability of the entire Andean region.  The FARC and AUC are 
the two most dangerous factions because of the violence they inflict on the 
country as a result of their continuous fighting over control of the coca producing 
territories.  The FARC claims to have 18,000 members and was started in 1966 
by communist militants and peasant farmers seeking to defend themselves 
against the wealthy land-owning elites.  The AUC boasts a smaller number of 
forces (approximately 8,000), but because it consists of several different 
paramilitary groups it is more fragmented and difficult to target with military 
force.3   
 
2 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” 15 June 
2000, World Bank, Development Research Group, 2. 
3 The number of FARC and AUC members was taken from 
http://www.terrorismanswers.com/groups/farc_print.html, accessed 04 June 2004. 
 
Figure 1.   Areas of Coca Production4 
                                            
4 USDOJ, USDOJ Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02006/index.html#4; Internet; accessed 07 June 2004. 
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The initial linkage between the guerilla forces and the drug industry grew 
out of the industry’s need for protection for its production and trafficking 
operations in the 1980s.5  The FARC had its roots as a Marxist revolutionary 
movement in the 1960s, with ideals based around land reorganization and the 
establishment of a communist-agrarian state.  But with the decline and fall of the 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the FARC saw their funding disappear as well.  
The group then turned to the drug industry to fill their financial gap.  The FARC 
had already begun to protect coca fields and processing labs in the 1980s, and 
even established pseudo-labor unions in certain areas with taxes, established 
wages, and regulations for the coca workers.  As the FARC’s involvement in the 
drug trade grew during the early 1990s, it reportedly grew fourfold, and from 
1998 to 2000 it expanded from an estimated 7,000-10,000 troops to between 
10,000 and 15,000 troops.6   
The insurgents’ presence in many of the remote areas in Colombia is 
facilitated by the government’s lack of presence in rural lands.  In 1999, 
President Pastrana ceded an area twice the size of New Jersey to the FARC as 
a concessionary gesture during peace negotiations that eventually stagnated.  
President Uribe then was stuck with the task of reclaiming these lands.  The 
struggle between the insurgent groups and the government of Colombia (GOC) 
has resulted in the deaths of over 4,000 people every year, with an additional 
3,000 kidnappings.7
Colombia saw a dramatic increase in coca production beginning in the 
1990s, which greatly contributed to conflict in the countryside as FARC and AUC 
fought over drug production and the government forcefully eradicated illicit crops.  
 
5 Francisco Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers Inc., 1995), 159. 
6 Nina M. Serfino, “Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options,” CRS Report to Congress, 
4 May 2000, Global Security Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/crscolom.htm; Internet; accessed 14 June 
2004. 
7 The number of deaths was taken from the USAID website available from 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/colombia/; Internet; accessed 08 
July 2004.  The number of kidnappings was taken fromThe Economist, “More Order and Less 
Law,” 7 November 2002, Economist Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1429562; Internet; accessed 14 June 2004. 
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A crackdown against coca cultivation and trafficking by the Peruvian and Bolivian 
governments in the mid-1990s led to a shift in cultivation from those countries 
into Colombia (Figure 1).  The farmers in Peru and Bolivia were taking part in 
crop substitution programs and the governments were increasing their 
eradication efforts while improving infrastructure and transportation in an effort to 
wean the farmers off illicit crops.  In 1995, seventy to eighty percent of the 
cocaine distributed on the international market was processed in Colombia.  Yet, 
in the same year there were only 55,900 hectares (1 hectare = 2.5 acres) of coca 
under cultivation in Colombia.8  This figure was less than in Peru, but more than 
in Bolivia, which had 115,300 and 48,600 hectares respectively.9  While the 
numbers declined in Peru and Bolivia over the next five years to 34,100 and 
14,600 hectares, respectively, the numbers for Colombia skyrocketed to a high of 
150,900 hectares in 2000.10   
Immediately prior to the increase in coca cultivation in Colombia, the U.S. 
and Colombian governments successfully dismantled the Medellin and Cali 
cartels, thus providing an opening for FARC and AUC to increase their role in 
coca cultivation. The Medellín cartel was headed by Pablo Escobar, who had a 
bellicose relationship with the guerrillas.  While building his wealthy drug empire 
he began aggressively pursuing the insurgent factions in order to maintain his 
own land holdings.  Aiding his effort was a new group formed by Fidel Castaño 
and his brother Carlos, the AUC.  These paramilitaries began to war with the 
FARC, the peasants, and the government.  When the cartels eventually were 
toppled by the U.S. and Colombian governments, the AUC and FARC were 
poised to take their place.  
 
8 Clawson and Lee, 17. 
9 The Economist, “The Struggle to Exterminate a Much Loved Andean Shrub,” 24 May 2001, 
Economist Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=631268; Internet; accessed 14 June 2004. 
10 Ibid. 
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B. GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA AND U.S. STRATEGIES 
Facing increased coca cultivation, violence in the countryside, and a 
guerrilla force flush with drug money and capable of inflicting serious defeats on 
the Colombian military, the government acted quickly to respond.  Plan Colombia 
was initiated by President Carlos Pastrana (1998-2002) and identifies drugs as 
the fuel for the conflict in Colombia.  According to the Plan, the primary objective 
was for the state to regain control of the entire country, many areas of which are 
currently inhabited by guerrilla forces.  It intended to achieve this goal by 
launching a massive eradication effort against coca crops in southern Colombia.  
This strategy has continued under Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense 
Policy, which stresses governmental control of the country as the primary 
objective for achieving peace and security.  
U.S. policy toward the Colombian drug problem thus far has consisted 
mainly of military interdiction, both aerial and maritime, Special Forces training 
programs, and aerial fumigation.  It includes attacking the transportation and 
organizational network by interdicting the movement, logistical transshipment, 
and funding of the product.  The strategy's main elements are:  to increase the 
collection of intelligence about the drug traffickers and their transportation net; 
improve CNP checkpoints on frequently traveled roads; raise the number of 
traffic stops made by the Colombian Navy on rivers and by the Colombian army 
at international checkpoints; expand drug-detection technology to all international 
airports and seaports; and establish a Heroin Task Force at the U.S. Embassy in 
Bogotá.11  Restrictions on the numbers of U.S. military troops and advisors that 
could be in Colombia and a limited Congressional mandate had kept the United 
States from overtly entering Colombia’s war against the insurgents and narco-
traffickers.  However, the events of 11 September 2001 led the U.S. Congress to 
increase those limits to 400 personnel in each category and to authorize the use 
of lethal force in the name of antiterrorism efforts.12  In addition to the eradication 
 
11 International Narcotics Control Board, “Annual Report-2002,” INCB Online [home page on-
line]; available from http://www.incb.org/e/index.htm; Internet; accessed 10 March 2003. 
12 U.S. Congress, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY 2004 
Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, Congressional Research Service, 25 July 2003, 2.  
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program, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been 
working with the government of Colombia on strengthening its institutions and 
promoting alternative development as a means of drug eradication.   
The proponents of Plan Colombia claimed its successful implementation 
would end Colombia’s civil war, revive the nation’s economy and put the narco-
traffickers out of business.  In order to execute the $7.5 billion, six-year plan as 
conceived by the Colombian and U.S. governments, Colombia asked for $3.5 
billion in international aid to supplement $4 billion of its own funding.13 Since 
1997, Colombia has received $3.67 billion from the U.S. alone in support of 
military and police assistance programs, designed primarily to support forced 
eradication and drug interdiction efforts.  Only $646.42 million has gone to 
support economic and social programs: seven percent to alternative 
development; four percent to human rights and judicial reform programs; four 
percent to aid the displaced; two percent to law enforcement; and less than one 
percent for other social and economic reforms.14  Of the $573 million FY2004 
funding package $150 million was earmarked for alternative development.15   
Pursuant to the military phase, farmers whose coca crops were eradicated would 
be offered some minimal funding for alternative crops, while little aid would be 
made available to those campesinos forced to flee their homes and their land.16   
In 2001, the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) was implemented by the 
Bush administration.  This new program was designed to be an extension of Plan 
Colombia, strictly targeted to social and economic development in Colombia and 
 
13 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Support for Plan Colombia,” U.S. Department of State 
Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/wwwhpcus.htm; Internet; accessed 10 March 2003. 
14 Total aid figure taken from Washington Office on Latin America. “Plan Colombia 3 Year 
Anniversary Report Card,” WOLA Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.wola.org/Colombia/plan_col_report_card03.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 June 2004.  All 
other numbers taken from Center for International Policy, “Colombia Program, U.S. Aid to 
Colombia Since 1997: Summary Tables,” CIP Online [home page on-line]: available from 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm; Internet; accessed 26 May 2004. 
15 U.S. Congress, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY 2004 
Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, Congressional Research Service, 25 July 2003, CRS-
38. 
16 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Support for Plan Colombia,” U.S. Department of State 
Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/wwwhpcus.htm; Internet; accessed 10 March 2003. 
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six surrounding countries:  Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Panama, and 
Venezuela.  ARI professed three goals, the first of which was to deepen 
democracy through judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, human rights 
monitoring, and encouraging the peace process in Colombia.  The second goal 
was to promote sustainable economic development and trade liberalization 
through alternative development, environmental protection, and renewal of the 
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).  The third was to reduce dramatically the 
supply of illicit drugs to the United States from the source countries through 
eradication, interdiction and fumigation.  The major selling point for the Bush 
administration’s plan in Congress was that over half of the program’s $882.29 
million was to be used for social and economic development. In the 2003 budget, 
however, only $149.2 million of the $597.3 million total for Colombia was 
earmarked for these programs.17  The request for FY2004 has similar numbers, 
$150 million designated for economic development out of $573 million.18  The 
rest of the funding is divided between varieties of programs ranging from 
“Promotion of Peace,” to “Strengthening of Democratic Governance.”  The Plan 
also involves continued training and support to the Colombian military and the 
Colombian National Police (CNP) in order to provide a security environment in 
which it will be possible for Colombia’s social development and judicial programs 
to flourish.   
In contrast to Plan Colombia, which in practice was largely centered on 
forced eradication (the “push into southern Colombia”), the general objective of 
President Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy is “to strengthen and 
guarantee the rule of law throughout Colombia, through the reinforcement of 
democratic authority: the free exercise of authority by the democratic institutions, 
the effective application of the law and the active participation of the citizen.”19  It 
is a policy oriented more toward protecting the citizens than destroying the narco-
traffickers and insurgents.  It is predicated on the assumption that the root of the 
 
17 Ibid, 5, 37. 
18 Ibid, 38. 
19 Republic of Colombia Ministry of Defense. Democratic Security and Defense Policy. 
(Colombia, 2003). 
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violence is not primarily poverty or inequality but the Colombian government’s 
historical inability to enforce its authority.  The task of establishing security is 
placed on the three branches of government, the international community, and 
the citizens of Colombia rather than on the military and police forces alone. 
The Policy is divided into five sections: (I) Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy, (II) Threats, (III) Strategic Objectives, (IV) Six Courses of Action: 
Coordinate, Strengthen, Consolidate, Protect, Cooperate, and Communicate, 
and (V) Financing and Assessment.  The first lays out what security means for 
Colombia, including the role of the government and its responsibilities.  The 
second identifies terrorism, illegal drugs and finance, arms trafficking, kidnapping 
and extortion, and homicide as the major threats to the security of the state.  The 
third section describes the objectives of state consolidation and control, 
protection of the people, elimination of the illicit drug trade, maintaining military 
deterrence against aggression, and efficiency within the administration, while the 
forth section details exactly how this will be accomplished.  The final and shortest 
of the sections deals with the financing of the Policy and means to assess its 
efficacy.   
The new approach taken by the Policy recognizes the problem of the 
guerrillas and the paramilitaries more as a matter of individual security than as a 
war.  “It [security] is rather the protection of the citizen and democracy by the 
state with the solidarity, cooperation and commitment of the whole society.”20  
This implies that every military commander is to ensure that no person is 
kidnapped, blackmailed, threatened, or murdered under the new policy. 
The Democratic Security and Defense Policy lays out explicit strategies for 
protecting Colombia’s citizens and infrastructure.  What distinguishes it from Plan 
Colombia is that most of these strategies have little to do with the military.  For 
example, in order to cut the homicide rate in Bogotá by fifty percent, the Policy 
calls for greater human and electronic intelligence gathering, a better command 
and sharing of information, clearly defined priorities, and more cooperation 




                                           
Board states succinctly that “Security is not principally a matter of coercion: it is 
the constant and effective presence of democratic authority, based on the 
collective effort of the whole of society.”21  This is exactly the premise behind 
President Uribe’s policy.  This is not to say that the military does not play a 
strategic role in the elimination of the drug industry.  Conversely, the military has 
been tasked by President Uribe to break the fighting will of the narco-terrorist 
organizations through decisive operational success and protection for the civilian 
population.  This will be accomplished through the disruption of the terrorist’s 
military power, growth, and financing. 
The Defense Policy denotes three pillars that it describes as the basis of 
democratic security.  The first of these, protection of the rights of all citizens, 
demonstrates Uribe’s dedication to establishing equal rights.  By stating outright 
that farmers and businessmen, men and women will all have the same rights, he 
is accomplishing two objectives.  Not only does he loosen the hold that the 
narco-traffickers have over the rural farmers, but he also unifies the country.  
Since the entire population is guaranteed the same rights, every Colombian 
citizen instantly has a vested interest in the maintenance and protection of those 
rights. 
The second pillar is the protection of democratic values, pluralism, and 
institutions.  This means ensuring that open political debate and competition 
within the political arena continue.  This protection is extended to opponents of 
the administration as well as supporters. 
The third pillar of the Policy is popular participation.  Stopping violence is 
the current administration’s top priority, but it also calls on the citizenry to 
denounce crime, pay taxes, offer jobs to demobilized paramilitaries, absorb the 
displaced, refuse to pay ransoms, and cooperate with the authorities.  Popular 




                                           
not only expressed through the use of the vote, but also through the observation 
and promotion of the civic values which uphold…the freedom of every 
individual.”22
The Policy asserts that the illegally armed groups feed on the absence of 
a central authority and that the way to protect citizens is to guarantee the 
presence of strong and legitimate institutions across the whole country.  Because 
the government does not possess the resources to place a soldier in every 
corner of Colombia, the reclamation of territorial control will take place gradually, 
beginning with the most strategically important zones.  In practice, however, the 
government has been under pressure to proceed on all fronts at once in order to 
show results.   With insurgent groups asserting their presence in forty percent of 
the country, security becomes difficult to achieve.23  Despite this fact, there are 
inroads being made by the Colombian government toward a secure state.   
The government currently has in place a special squad of soldiers and 
federal policemen, supported by the mobile brigades, in addition to the battalions 
in the mountains blocking the guerrillas from passing to the plateaus.  Once this 
group secures the area and the local district attorney’s office has tried those who 
have committed crimes there, the process of consolidating state control will 
begin.  
Thus far, the military has certainly been the most effective tool of 
government in restoring state control and administrative services to contested 
areas; although the Constitutional Court pulled many of its teeth when it declared 
that military courts were unconstitutional.  State coordination, even within the 
military, has obvious flaws.  The Policy clearly says that “the lack of effective 
coordination among institutions has perhaps been one of the greatest 
deficiencies in the state’s response to the citizens’ security.”24  In order to 
guarantee security, the plan mandates the creation of a Security and National 
Defense Council, through which the president will coordinate the execution of the 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 USGAO, “Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for U.S. Programs in 
Colombia Have Not Been Developed,” June 2003, 1. 
24 Democratic Security and Defense Policy. 
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national security strategy with the ministries and the Public Force (the armed 
forces and the National Police).  It also mandates the creation of an integrated 
“Board of Intelligence,” comprising the directors of the intelligence agencies, 
which will produce analyses on which the President and the Minister of Defense 
can base decisions.  This last point is crucial because inter-departmental 
jealousies continue to hinder antiterrorism operations. 
Colombia has adopted a strategy of tax enforcement to fund the Policy.  
Soon after his inauguration in 2002, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe decreed a 
“State of Internal Disturbance” under which the government imposed a one-time 
tax on the wealthiest segment of the Colombian population.  This tax provided 
between $800 million and $1 billion and was dedicated exclusively to security.25  
In addition, the government will brandish another “big stick” in the face of those 
involved in the illicit drug industry.  All lands, property, and assets of persons 
engaged in illegal activities will be seized by the state and reapportioned for the 
benefit of society.  The efficacy of this law depends on the ability of the state to 
enforce it.  This coordination of state action and bolstering of state mechanisms, 
the judiciary being paramount, is at the heart of Uribe’s policy. 
Alternative development is mentioned only sporadically throughout the 
Policy and even then is overtly subjugated to security.  In the Six Courses of 
Action section it states, “Economic development and employment opportunities 
also require a climate of security to permit investment, trade, and local authority 
spending for the benefit of communities, all of which have suffered constant 
predation by illegal armed groups.”26   
The first direct reference to alternative development comes in the fourth 
section under the subheading Elimination of the Illegal Drug Trade.  The Policy 
states that, “Alternative programs must be realistic and sustainable and provide 
an income for farming and indigenous families who currently live from the 
 
25 U.S. Department of State, “A Report to Congress on United States Policy Toward 
Colombia and Other Related Issues,” U.S. Department of State Online [home page on-line]; 
available from  http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rpt/17140pf.htm; Internet; accessed 20 Sep 2003. 
26 Ibid. 
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proceeds of coca and poppy cultivation.”27  These programs are identified as the 
primary method of ending illegal drug cultivation.  However, almost no 
elaboration is offered on the tactics involved.  A sentence dictating that 
reforestation programs could provide legitimate income to farmers and jumpstart 
environmental conservation receives little elaboration. Immediately following this 
statement is the call for financial support from the international community based 
on co-responsibility.  This idea of co-responsibility is revisited in the second and 
final mention of alternative development in the Policy.  In the Six Courses of 
Action section it states, “Every country which shares responsibility for the illegal 
drug problem should make a joint effort to: offer alternative employment 
opportunities and financial support to small-scale coca and poppy farmers who 





                                           
C. GAINS IN SECURITY AND ERADICATION 
In an attempt to rectify the problem of illicit drug cultivation in Colombia, 
President Uribe instituted a number of controversial steps with regard to law 
enforcement.  Beginning in October 2002, he invoked emergency powers 
granted under the 1991 Colombian constitution that allowed security forces to 
make arrests without warrants and impose strict controls on movements in 
conflict-ridden areas of Colombia.  These emergency powers may be declared 
for ninety days, and then renewed for two additional ninety-day periods.  In order 
to further efforts to regain control of Colombia, the Uribe administration also 
introduced legislation in April of 2003 that would give security forces permanent 
powers to tap phones and to search homes without warrants in all parts of the 
country.  This is highly indicative of the law enforcement strategy contained 
within the Democratic Security and Defense Policy. 
President Uribe is also streamlining and reforming the Colombian military 
so that it is more effective, professional and capable of capturing narco-terrorist 
leaders or otherwise disrupting the command level of the illegal armed factions in 
Colombia.  The recently reorganized CD Brigade now has greater reach and 
effectiveness.  It is able to operate throughout Colombia with an improved ability 
to attack the drug-industry leadership.29
President Uribe’s policies have thus far led to significant gains in 
eradication and security, earning his administration support form the international 
community and laying the groundwork for future alternative development efforts.  
Kidnappings have been reduced, the murder rate has declined, the AUC has 
agreed to partial demobilization, and the hectares of illicit crops under cultivation 
has greatly decreased.  Following the failures of the Pastrana administration in its 
attempts to negotiate with the insurgents and the near-creation of a de facto 
FARC state within Colombia, this appears to be a ray of light for the people of 
Colombia. 
 
29 The paragraph is a compilation of information gathered from the, “International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report-2002.” 
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The Colombian Ministry of Defense reported that the number of 
kidnappings has been reduced by 23.7% since July 2002.30  This is a dramatic 
achievement toward establishing security and recovering the faith of the 
Colombian people in the government.  A further indicator of the success the GOC 
is the decline in the murder rate by almost half within the same time frame.31  
These two statistics provide tangible evidence to Colombian citizens that the 
administration is truly taking back control of the country.  Estimates of how much 
of the country the FARC, AUC, and ELN are present in vary between forty and 
fifty percent, however, and provide far less solace to the people.    
Uribe has not ruled out negotiations with the paramilitaries as a means of 
realizing peace.  In May 2004 the Colombian government reached an agreement 
with ten leaders of the AUC to continue demobilization negotiations in Córdoba, a 
northern province, in the wake of the suspected murder of Carlos Castaño by his 
own AUC colleagues.  The offer on the table would have the AUC leaders 
confined rather than imprisoned for five to ten years, but would not make their 
privileges contingent on continued demobilization.  While this may seem overly 
generous to the Bush administration, which is seeking extradition of many of the 
groups’ leaders on drug charges, and to human rights organizations that blame 
the AUC for violence against noncombatants, it may nevertheless be too stern for 
the purported 20,000 members of the AUC. 
Coupled with the partial demobilization of the AUC is the capture or killing 
of members of the various guerrilla organizations.  Over 8,400 members of the 
FARC and ELN have been captured since Uribe took office and almost 2,500 
have been killed.32  Moreover, the number of insurgents who voluntarily 
disarmed and surrendered increased by eighty-nine percent in 2003 to more than 
2,200, showing that these fighters feel the state can afford them adequate 
 
30 Presidency of the Republic-Ministry of Defense, “The Effectiveness of the Colombian 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy, August 2002-November 2003.” GOC online, accessed 
18 May 2004, 3. 
31 Ibid, 4. 
32 Ibid, 4. 
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protection for the information they provide.33  This valuable information on future 
attacks, drug trafficking routes and schedules, and locations of leaders and 
camps has helped increase the rate of extradition to the United States of 
criminals charged in drug and terrorist related offenses.  In 2003 alone, sixty-
seven individuals were extradited to the United States.34   
The most important result of improved security is what it has done to the 
drug trade and illegal crop cultivation in Colombia.  Uribe promised during his 
presidential campaign that counter-drug efforts would be centered on aerial 
eradication and alternative development.  Since then the GOC reports that there 
has been a thirty-two percent decrease in the amount of illicit crops grown in 
Colombia.35  Further, the U.S. Department of State reported that approximately 
130,000 hectares of coca and opium were destroyed by aerial fumigation in 
2003.36  However, this is a far cry from the more than 196,000 hectares claimed 
to have been sprayed by the CNP.  The Colombian estimate would account for 
the elimination of over 46 tons of cocaine valued at $12.6 billion.37  The U.S. 
Department of State report estimates that 144,000 hectares of coca were under 
cultivation in 2002 (estimates for 2003 are not yet available), indicating a 26,000 
hectare reduction from the previous year.38  Accuracy in these estimates is 
difficult to come by as seen by the variance above.  However, the important point 
is the trend in the numbers, which has been steadily downward during Uribe’s 
term.  Most importantly, both the U.S. and Colombian governments agree that 
eradication has been extremely effective in key areas of the Colombian 
 
33 Ibid, 5. 
34 U.S. Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” released 
March 2004, accessed from http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/29832.htm; 27 
May 2004. 
35 GOC-Ministry of Defense, 6. 
36 USDS, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.” 
37 GOC- Ministry of Defense, 7. 
38 USDS, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.” 
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countryside such as Putumayo, where the U.S. government estimates over 80 
percent of the coca has been destroyed.39
Another important factor in reducing the amount of illegal drugs coming 
out of Colombia was the restoration of the Air Bridge Denial program in 2003 
after a two-year hiatus.  Numerous aircraft used for smuggling have been 
destroyed or captured along with several tons of cocaine.  Moreover, this 
aggressive program is forcing the traffickers to both invent new methods of 
transportation and invest more capital in shipping, rather than reinvesting the 
profits in further cultivation.   
All of these gains are contributing to the paramount goal of state 
consolidation under the Colombian government and the eradication of drug 
crops.  The question remains, however, whether the Colombian government will 
be able to consolidate these gains through the successful implementation of 
alternative development programs.   
President Uribe has brought to his country a new sense of confidence.  He 
has pushed through the Colombian legislature inspiring legislation designed to 
restructure the state, and has produced a national security strategy that explicitly 
defines Colombia’s intentions and outlines a pragmatic plan to accomplish its 
mission.  This strategy will utilize government resources to destroy illegally 
armed factions and the drug trafficking that funds them.  
The Democratic Security and Defense Policy is a document that will 
require time to determine its full efficacy.  However, the results thus far are 
promising.  The government has been able to reduce the amount of land under 
coca cultivation for the first time in a decade and has begun to establish a 
government presence in many areas where this did not exist.  Both of these 
advances are necessary for the success of alternative development programs.  
As the recent experiences of Bolivia and Peru demonstrate, these programs 
require state control over the areas in which they are to be implemented – a 
condition which President Uribe’s administration has begun to fulfill.  In addition, 
successful alternative development programs require that peasants understand  
39 Central Intelligence Agency, “Major Narcotics Producing Nations: Cultivation and 
Production Estimates, 1998-2002,” p. 8. 
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that illicit crop cultivation is no longer a viable option.  The government’s vigorous 
eradication efforts have made this clear to peasants in key areas of Colombia, 
particularly in the Putumayo region, thus facilitating the implementation of 
alternative development in those areas. 
In sum, the stage has now been set for the pursuit of alternative 
development programs necessary to consolidate the gains made in eradicating 
coca crops and establishing state legitimacy.  These programs are necessary to 
help peasants establish a living that does not depend upon cultivating illicit crops, 
thus consolidating the reductions in coca cultivation achieved through eradication 
programs.  In addition, alternative development programs are an important 
demonstration of the state’s concern for the well-being of peasants in many long-
neglected areas, thus helping to consolidate gains in state legitimacy achieved 
through recent security efforts.  The following chapter discusses the extent to 





































III. COMPONENTS OF SUCCESSFUL ALTERNATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT PORGRAMS 
Can alternative development contribute to the resolution of the drug 
problem in Colombia?  One of the greatest challenges for alternative 
development policy in Colombia’s current situation is to be effective and meet 
objectives in the midst of the government’s struggle to regain control of the 
country.  In the short term, military interdiction and police raids may destroy a few 
illicit crops and produce the arrests of a few traffickers.  But without continued 
and proportional support of alternative development, these gains will not be 
consolidated.  A more equitable distribution of funding between the military and 
police and alternative development will make the advantages to the farmers of 
participation in crop substitution or voluntary eradication programs more obvious, 
thus garnering more support for the programs.   
More than a year has passed since Uribe introduced the Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy, and the government has made several gains in the 
elimination of the drug industry and the reconstitution of the country under state 
control.  These gains in security could be setting the foundation for an effective 
alternative development program, but it is important to understand what the 
necessary ingredients of such a program are.  This chapter will examine the 
components of a successful alternative development program and evaluate 
whether the U.S. and Colombian governments have the appropriate policies in 
place for alternative development to succeed.  
 
A. THE CHALLENGES OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
The 20th Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
recognized the definition of alternative development as, 
…a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants 
containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through 
specifically designed rural development measures in the context of 
sustained national economic growth and sustainable development 
efforts in countries taking actions against drugs, recognizing the 
particular socio-cultural characteristics of the target communities 
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and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and 
permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs.40  
Discounting the fact that coca cultivation is illegal, it does have features 
that make it attractive to farmers and difficult for governments to replace with 
substitute crops.  One is the ease of marketing.  Unlike substitute crops that have 
the added expenses of delivery to market and competition for customers, coca is 
often picked up right at the field by the buyers.  Another advantage of coca 
farming is the immediacy of crop yields.  An income generating harvest can be 
produced in less than two years from initial planting, while alternatives can take 
as many as four years to produce.41  Another quality of coca that makes it 
attractive is the relative ease of farming compared to other crops.  Coca, native 
to the Andean highlands, by nature is a hardy bush that can survive harsh 
conditions.  Less than two percent of the land in Colombia is considered arable, 
making any crop that can subsist on poor quality soil and little water enticing.42 
Another benefit is the rapid realization of a return from the initial investment in 
coca plants.   In addition, the relative ease of producing coca paste from the 
leaves of the coca plant has stifled any attempt at industrializing the coca-
producing regions for alternative crop production.  Necessary accoutrements 
such as sheds and chemical precursors are easily obtained and transported.  
Electricity, running water, and sewage removal are either not required or 
provided by the most basic means. 
Although these factors may make coca farming seem desirable, there are 
several reasons why farmers may find coca cultivation repellant.  The most 
obvious disadvantage is the violence associated with coca farming.  Narco-
traffickers use violence both to induce participation in the coca industry (i.e., plant 
 
40 United Nations, General Assembly, S-20/4, Measures to Enhance International 
Cooperation to Counter the World Drug Problem, 08 September 1998 [homepage on-line]; 
available from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/resolution_1998-09-08_3.html#E; Internet; accessed 
01 June 2004. 
41 Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselear W. Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1996), 152. 
42 Central Intelligence Agency, “World Factbook – Colombia,” CIA Online [home page on-
line] available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/co.html; Internet; accessed 
07 June 2004.  
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it or die) and as a means of conflict resolution.  Disputes between buyers and 
farmers regarding prices are frequently settled with violence.  Conflict also could 
arise over perceived cheating on the side of the farmer, or fear that the farmer 
will expose the traffickers to the government.  In either case, guilt or innocence is 
subject to the perception of the narco-trafficker. The paramilitaries in Colombia 
bring an additional level of violence to the industry.  They often use coercion in 
the isolated areas they control to elicit money or supplies from the coca 
farmers.43
Another disadvantage is the rising cost of coca production as a result of 
the eradication efforts.  Forced eradication, while viewed by critics as iniquitous 
to farmers and contributing to the rural support of insurgent groups, is 
fundamental to creating an environment where alternative development can be 
effective.  Without demonstrable consequences for illicit cultivation farmers have 
less motivation to stop or seek alternatives.  This leads to the necessity of having 
these alternatives in place in order to avoid the possibility of farmers migrating to 
the insurgent labor market.   
With the escalating levels of violence and eradication in recent years, 
there seems to be a growing willingness among farmers to abandon coca and 
poppy cultivation if offered an economically viable alternative.  Given this, it 
would seem to make sense for both the Colombian and U.S. governments to 
invest the necessary resources in alternative development programs.  The 
question then becomes: what are the necessary ingredients for a successful 
alternative development program? 
 
B. INGREDIENTS OF SUCCESSFUL ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMS 
First and foremost, the success of alternative development programs 
requires a strong state presence that is able to provide security to its population.  
Without such protection, many Colombian farmers would face serious retribution 
from armed groups such as the FARC and AUC for switching to legitimate crops.  
 
43 Clawson and Lee, 154. 
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The escalation in activity by these groups, which increasingly involves violence 
against the civilian population, is turning those who live in the coca-producing 
areas into military targets.  As the 2002 GAO report on the status of alternative 
development in Colombia noted, the experiences of Peru and Bolivia 
underscored the importance of government control over project areas.  Effective 
and sustained interdiction operations must be complementary to alternative 
development rather than the focus of state activities.  Difficulties have arisen in 
the past because the Colombian government did not control large parts of the 
coca-growing areas. 
Experts also agree that policy makers interested in providing alternative to 
coca production should make a clear, official commitment to the goals of 
economic development.44  The experience of other countries indicates that the 
strength of the overall economy is an important factor in shaping whether or not 
individuals turn to coca production.  In Peru, for example, the recovery of the 
national economy in the mid-1990s helped draw urban residents, who had earlier 
fled to the countryside in search of a living growing coca, back to the cities and 
the legitimate economy.45  Since much of the land used for coca cultivation is not 
suitable for alternative crops, national policymakers must consider more general 
economic development programs as an alternative for coca growers. 
Clawson and Lee outline five elements of successful crop substitution 
programs in The Andean Cocaine Industry.46  First, suitable replacement crops 
must be introduced and must offer reasonable income parity with coca.  This 
does not mean that the exact monetary amount should be near the value of coca, 
but rather the risk premium associated with illicit crops should be discounted from 
their market value.  Simply put, farmers will accept a lower income if it is safer.  
This requires funding for agricultural research to determine which crops are going 
to thrive in different areas and provide a living for the farmers.  The chosen crops 
 
44 Clawson and Lee, and the Feldafing Conference both state this point. 
45 Clawson and Lee. 
46 Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselear W. Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1996). 
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may in fact increase the profit margin of the farmer, as did coffee in Peru.47  
Nontraditional, high-value export crops should be tested (e.g., black pepper in 
Bolivia).48   
Second, there must be a market for the legal crops and farmers must have 
access to these markets.49  If the farmer cannot reach his customers with the 
produce, or if the cost of transporting the produce is so high that the profit is all 
but eliminated, the market becomes obsolete.  In recognition of these obstacles, 
alternative development programs sponsored by the United Nations and USAID 
have begun to upgrade existing roads and bridges and provide transportation at 
lower cost to the farmer, thereby improving the legal crops’ attractiveness.50  The 
farmers need sufficient compensation to compete with the ease of coca market 
access. Subsidies to one sector, however, can have a strong negative effect on 
another in a weak economy. While the farmers are better off with improved 
market access and thus will be less likely to cultivate illicit crops, commercial 
truckers who have been involved in legitimate industry and commerce from the 
start pay the price for the farmer’s prior illegal activity by having to lower their 
reserve wages to compete with government-subsidized transportation. 
Third, appropriate industrialization must be present to process the crops 
and retain the “value added” within the producing country.51  These technologies 
can range from rudimentary fans in simple storage facilities to complex canning 
factories and refrigerated storage.  Particular crops require processing just to 
reach a market.  Without preservation papaya and roses, for instance, would lose 
their value in a matter of days.  Major markets such as the United States and the 
European Union would be inaccessible to perishable crops.   
Fourth, alternative development should provide social infrastructure so as 
to improve the quality of life for the farmer.52  Schools, medical clinics, and 
 
47 Ibid, 157. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid, 143, 157. 
50 USDS, “International Narcotics Strategy Report.” 
51 Clawson and Lee, 157. 
52 Ibid, 158. 
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recreational facilities may not directly contribute to the alternative development 
effort, but they will make inroads into winning the “hearts and minds” of the 
narcotics farmer.  Even if substitute crops do not yield as much disposable 
income as coca, farmers will be compensated with improvements in lifestyle. 
Fifth, alternative development tends to work between where farmers 
create cooperatives.  The purpose of these organizations is to increase the 
power of the farmer with respect to the buyer and the market.53  As cooperation 
improves among the farmers they can begin to improve technical skills and the 
cultivation of legitimate crops.  In Colombia, these cooperatives may also help to 
regain control of areas that are currently dominated by armed groups. 
A successful alternative development program must be able to monitor the 
peasants to ensure that funds provided are used to produce only substitute crops 
and those peasants do not follow their typical strategy of continuing to cultivate 
small plots of coca as insurance against the failure of the alternative crops.  
Alternative development requires tremendous trust on behalf of the farmers - that 
not only will the substitute crops take to the soil in the region, but also that there 
will continue to be a favorable market for the crops in the future.  While complete 
crop substitution initially may not be reliable enough for most farmers to provide a 
living for their families, interspersing legitimate crops with the coca as part of a 
transition process is often seen by farmers as a more viable option.  In this 
regard effective monitoring of alternative development programs is necessary.   
The comparative experience demonstrates that the characteristics in this 
chapter are necessary for the success of alternative development efforts.  The 
following section evaluates the extent to which these characteristics are present 
in the Colombian case.   
 
C. EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN COLOMBIA 
President Álvaro Uribe (2002-present) has developed a strategy that is 
substantively different from that of the preceding administration of Andres 




                                           
development was no more than an afterthought, to alleviate the problems caused 
by aerial spraying when Plan Colombia was introduced, but few farmers were 
monitored to ensure their compliance.54  Protests by rural farmers in 1996 had 
underscored the magnitude of former President Ernesto Samper’s (1994-1998) 
failure to substitute legitimate sources of income for illegal crops.  Poor 
institutional management, which led to the elimination of PLANTE, the agency 
responsible for overseeing alternative development, revealed further faults within 
the Pastrana administration.   
Uribe has indicated that his alternative development policy is not an 
afterthought and that its implementation is based on developing the country 
regionally.  The initial alternative development program, with voluntary 
eradication undertaken in exchange for financing of local projects implemented 
by USAID, however, had little to do with Uribe’s regional development scheme.  
On the contrary, the eradication plan was based on the Colombian government’s 
commitment to Washington to eliminate illicit crops from a particular area, for 
which the only indicator of success was crop reduction, not regional 
development.   
Despite government advances, lack of control over the coca-growing 
lands is the biggest obstacle that the Colombian government must over come.55  
Without control it is impossible to monitor alternative development programs or 
provide access to markets for legal crops that may be seized by insurgents.  
Further, any improvements in social infrastructure or industrialization would only 
benefit the insurgents in land they control.  Coupled with difficulty in maintaining 
consistent eradication operations and coordination between these and alternative 
development programs, Colombia’s previous attempts at alternative development 
had not seen success.56
The introduction of the Town Soldier program in 2002, which provides 
military and police training to local men and women, impedes the ability of armed 
 
54 Carmen Sesin, “Challenges to Colombian Farmers,” MSNBC Online [home page on-line]; 
available from http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3340833/; Internet; accessed 08 June 2004. 
55 Ibid, 12. 
56 Ibid. 
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groups to establish control over the population.57   This severely hinders the 
ability of guerrilla and paramilitary groups to control territories that constitute 
strategic points for commercialization and routes for illegal transactions 
(smuggling of drugs, arms and ammunition).  As a result, they are less able to 
undermine local political authority, take advantage of the lack of governance, or 
create greater uncertainty and a general sense of insecurity.  Further, because of 
an increased security presence these groups are less able to exert pressure on 
the farmers to continue to grow illicit crops.  Despite these advances, security 
remains an issue in many areas and limits the ability of the government to carry 
out sustained eradication operations and alternative development programs. 
In the recent past, the weakness of Colombia’s economy has left its 
population even more vulnerable to the enticements of illegal crop cultivation. 
Economic policies outlined in Plan Colombia seemed to exacerbate this danger. 
Under “Stabilization Measures” in the section titled, “Approach to the Colombian 
Economy,” Plan Colombia states that public companies and banks are to be 
privatized, including the utility companies and the state's coal mining company.58  
Such privatization of state-owned companies will inevitably lead to massive 
layoffs, further increasing unemployment at a time when cutbacks in government 
spending as stipulated by the IMF will remove any vestiges of a social safety net 
for those affected.  This action may promote a migration of workers from the 
formal market to the rural informal market in search of any work, including 
cultivation of illicit crops, thus directly undermining any progress toward drug 
eradication. 
 Plan Colombia attempts to address these issues when it states, 
“Assistance is essential to minimize the short-term negative impact of fiscal 
consolidation on unemployment and other social problems, which ultimately 
 
57 The Town Soldier program projects having 55 percent of the municipalities in Colombia 
involved by 2005.  GOC-Ministry of Defense, 8. 
58 United States Institute of Peace Library, “Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and 
the Strengthening of the State,” USIP Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/colombia/adddoc/plan_colombia_101999.html#approach; Internet; 
accessed 12 March 2003. 
increase the spread of illicit activities.”59  And yet, none of the U.S. aid package 
in support of Plan Colombia is directed towards coping with the expected 
“unemployment and other social problems” the Plan is likely to make worse. 
 Also, the reference in the Plan to the “short-term negative impact of fiscal 
consolidation” fails to denote exactly how long the short term will likely be.  Many 
Latin American nations implemented their fiscal austerity and adjustment 
programs according to IMF dictates more than a decade ago, and during that 
time the income disparity between the region’s rich and poor has increased 
dramatically, as has the number of people living in poverty.60  There is no 
evidence that this disturbing trend will turn around in the near future, which leads 
to the conclusion that the short term is at least 10 years.  Under the Pastrana 
administration Colombia saw economic growth that was uncharacteristic of Latin 
American countries in the last decade.61  However, this growth was marred by 
the high deficits incurred by the government which grew at a greater rate than the 
economy.62  President Uribe’s gains in security thus far have garnered support 
from the U.S., but economic recovery will take longer to manifest.  The fighting 
between the government and the guerrillas necessary to increase security within 
the country is both driving away economic development and setting the stage for 
it. 
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The 2002 USGAO report states, “The overall alternative development 
approach in Colombia entails reaching agreements with communities to 
voluntarily eradicate illicit crops in exchange for help finding other income-
producing opportunities and other assistance.”63  The incentives provided to 
small farmers are designed to induce them willingly to destroy their coca crops.  




61 Colombia had a 3.6 percent growth from 1990-2000 compared to many Latin American 
countries which experienced negative growth rates.  The Economist, World in Figures-2003, 68. 
62 John Price, “Colombia: Balancing War with Growth,” Tendencias Online [home page on-
line]; available from 
http://tendencias.infoamericas.com/article_archive/2002/033/0206_economic_outlook.htm; 
Internet; accessed 12 July 2004. 
63 USGAO, 2002, 9. 
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Desarrollo Alternativo (PNDA), Colombia’s alternative development program 
(also known as PLANTE), planned to provide them with food crop seeds and 
plants or other immediate assistance.   
From a strictly ecological perspective many of the areas that currently 
grow coca are suited for nothing else.  Only two percent of the land in Colombia 
is arable.64  The rest is stricken with an overabundance of rain, soil with highly 
toxic levels of minerals including iron and manganese, and terrain more 
conducive to mountain goat breeding than farming.65  Because coca is 
essentially a native weed that flourishes in these harsh conditions, straight crop 
swapping is not feasible for most coca farmers.  In order for them to participate in 
typical substitution programs the farmers would have to migrate to more 
hospitable lands.  The government does not account for the fact that most of the 
arable land is already under legal cultivation and would not support additional 
farmers. 
Between December 2000 and July 2001, thirty-three manual eradication 
pacts involving 37,775 families were signed in nine districts of the Colombian 
Putumayo region.  Of these, 6,000 families lived in the district of Puerto Asís.  In 
February 2002, parts of the food security project had been delivered to 1,800 of 
them, representing 4.8% of the total number of families committed to the pacts 
and only 30% of those in the pilot district of Puerto Asís.  Considering that the 
first pacts were signed in December 2000, delivery to these 4.8% of the families 
occurred over a period of fourteen months.  This undertaking closely reproduced 
the limitations of the alternative development model implemented in Peru and 
Bolivia, whose basic measures of success were the degree and speed of the 
forced eradication.  While in principle the pacts and food security projects were 
consistent with the ingredients of successful alternative development, the failure 
to deliver supplies by the Colombian government spread doubt among the 
 
64 CIA factbook Colombia webpage 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/co.html, accessed 5 December 2003. 
65 Clawson and lee, 148. 
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farmers as to the viability of the programs.  This forced them to revert back to 
illicit crops despite their demonstrated willingness to change. 66
Reduction of coca crops in the shortest possible time was the priority of 
these programs. Therefore, planners sought to establish a firm starting date for 
manual eradication that would help ensure its dissuasive effect. The strategy of 
strengthening communities as a step toward regional development and the 
creation of a culture of regional identity, as Uribe later conceived in the Policy, 
was nearly invisible.  Moreover, trust between the government and communities 
based on a vision of area development was also eroded.67   
Community members and local authorities regarded dietary self-
sufficiency as a necessary step in creating sustainable conditions for the region’s 
population.  It was considered a way to lay the foundation for a peasant culture 
that would produce consumer goods and strengthen basic social and economic 
networks.  This project sought to solidify joint efforts between local authorities 
and communities to achieve an improved basic level of subsistence and dietary 
sustainability that would supplant the poverty level subsistence of many farming 
families.68
The original idea was to ensure the sale of surplus goods produced by 
initial investments in dietary self-sufficiency (e.g., poultry farms, sale of milk and 
meat, subsistence products, fruits), to raise income to a level that would make it 
possible to sustain and reproduce activities in this area.  Another goal was to 
provide the inputs, seeds and technology needed for activities that would result in 
surplus production.69
However, the required technical and financial assistance was not 
delivered and the Colombian government cancelled a study that would have 
evaluated the potential for production, requirements for equipment and 
 
66 All data in this paragraph was taken from the USAID website; available from 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/colombia/; Internet; accessed 17 
June 2004. 
67 Information in this paragraph was taken from Drugs and Conflict, “Alternative Development 




                                           
resources, and general technical planning for such a program.  Officials also 
blocked a proposed evaluation of the conditions necessary for ensuring access 
to and control over the production chain for marketing surplus products.  This is a 
further example of the way state decisions can cause the government to lose the 
faith of the people.  If the citizens of a democracy do not believe that the 
government can accomplish the objectives it sets, the government destroys the 
very foundation of its power.70
Since the 2001 implementation of the USAID alternative development 
program in coca growing areas, only eleven percent of the money apportioned 
has been used.  Farmers are continuing to grow illicit crops, and drug production 
shows no sign of declining in certain regions such as Guaviare, which saw a 
thirty-eight percent increase in 2002.71   
Along with these roadblocks, Colombia faces additional obstacles in 
implementing the alternative development programs.  The level of compliance by 
the farmers participating in such programs continues to be questionable.  The 
2002 USGAO report also identifies weak state and commercial institutions, lack 
of funding from the European Community, and the remote location of many of the 
project sites as further hindrances. 
The main reason for Colombia’s inability to monitor and evaluate 
alternative development programs in the past has been the weakness of state 
institutions.  This was brought to light in the 2002 USGAO report detailing the 
problems alternative development is facing in Colombia.72  This report stated that 
monitoring of farmers who agreed to voluntary eradication was largely left to peer 
pressure within the given community, in the absence of an official procedure.  
The ability to oversee these programs requires state control of the region in 
which they are implemented.  Actions to correct this shortcoming are beginning 
 
70 Ibid. 
71 CIA Report on Drug Cultivation in Latin America, 2. 
72 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, Drug Control Efforts to Develop Alternatives to 
Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles, U.S. 
General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., 2002, 14. 
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to take shape under PLANTE which was revived and strengthened under 
President  Uribe  and  his  administration.   As  an example of better government  
oversight, some farmers who agree to voluntary eradication are able to mark 
their fields with Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment to avoid aerial 
fumigation.73
President Uribe’s alternative development policies attempt to rectify many 
of the shortcomings of preceding efforts; however security continues to be the 
paramount problem.  Much of the Democratic Security and Defense Policy is 
aimed at reestablishing security in the country, but more attention needs to be 
paid to alternative development programs that will be implemented after security 
has been improved.   
President Uribe’s alternative development policy recognizes the effects of 
the armed conflict on the areas where illicit crops are produced and therefore 
addresses these issues in the state security strategy.  The Colombian 
government has designed an “integral intervention strategy based on the creation 
of economically and environmentally sustainable alternatives for the development 
of areas in conflict.”74  This shifts the focus from a reactive alternative 
development program to a proactive ongoing regional development program.  It 
also recognizes the importance of state control in eradicating drugs and fostering 
development, and attends to the problems raised in the USGAO 2002 report.   
Based on community participation, the strategy seeks to increase the 
scope and effectiveness of the state’s policies in these regions, developing a 
secure atmosphere that eliminates the need for emergency aid by ensuring the 
sustainability of the substitute crops.  This apparently is an attempt to reduce the 
size of the stick in the “carrot and stick” approach, recognizing the connection 
between armed conflict, illicit crops, and the absence of state legitimacy. 
Thanks to Uribe’s policies, alternative development is no longer to be seen 
as playing a subservient role to aerial spraying. Instead, it serves to empower the 
state in producer zones by focusing on regional economic strength.  This implies 
 
73 Sesin. 
74 Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 
“Hacia un Estado Comunitario.” Page 54 (Web version). 
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that the government is willing to adopt more flexible criteria for planning its 
substitution strategy that are adapted to the specific conditions of the conflict in 
each region. 
Development priority is given to projects that offer advantages in the areas 
of employment; income; strengthening of community organizations; and 
consolidation of programs and projects aimed at making local and regional 
development self-supporting.  This approach acknowledges the need for 
policymakers to make adjustments based on the status of the internal armed 
conflict, and seeks to diversify alliances with civil society organizations. 
Uribe’s development strategy is made up of three components:  
− Production and income-generating projects;  
− Institution building and strengthening of communities;  
− Construction and improvement of physical and social infrastructure.  
The first component includes a proposal to implement forestry projects for 
50,000 families presently involved in the cultivation of coca and opium poppy.  A 
total of 150,000 new hectares of forest would be established for commercial uses 
and 120,000 for protection of watersheds and headwaters, along with plans for 
titling and management of nearly one million hectares of natural forest.75  The 
institution-building and community-strengthening component aims at re-
establishing trust in the state, increasing levels of acceptance and legitimacy and 
solidifying mechanisms for stimulating development and security.  The political 
basis of the development programs is the establishment of security, which is 
understood to include community participation and the building of local 
governmental institutions. 
There have been many gains made since the introduction of Plan 
Colombia in 1999 and President Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense 
Policy, not only in the realm of drug eradication, but also in terms of state 
consolidation.  Some of the necessary ingredients for successful alternative 
development programs have been addressed and still others have not.  The 
maintenance and increase in forced eradication efforts vital to the success of  
75 Republic of Colombia Ministry of Defense. Democratic Security and Defense Policy. 
Colombia, 2003. 
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alternative development has seen staunch commitment from both the U.S. and 
Colombian governments.  The introduction of Uribe’s policy in itself demonstrated 
that Colombia has separated their national law enforcement strategy from their 
alternative development strategy and has a clear commitment to both, but 
coordination between the two is tenuous.   
Colombia’s government has made significant efforts to incorporate many 
of these ingredients into its drug control strategy, with the continued support of 
Washington.  However, the development program continues to propagate some 
of the failures identified in the 2002 USGAO report.  “Poor coordination of 
alternative development, interdiction, and eradication activities limits the mutually 
reinforcing benefits of these actions.”76  While the establishment of security and a 
government presence in the coca-growing regions of the country indicates that 
the Colombian government is beginning to address many of the issues that have 
plagued alternative development in the past (i.e., monitoring and evaluation, 
market access, and establishment of farming cooperatives), the economic well-
being of the farmers following eradication is still not sufficiently addressed.  Much 
of the money for alternative development is being funneled toward crop 
substitution programs while social infrastructure and local rural industrialization in 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION INVOLVEMENT IN COLOMBIAN ALTERNATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT 
The success of any alternative development program will rely on the 
support it receives from the international community.  Colombia has explicitly 
indicated that it is counting on alternative development support from all nations 
whose demand for drugs contributes to the problem of coca cultivation in 
Colombia.  Moreover, other U.S. financial obligations around the world (e.g., Iraq 
and Haiti) are making it more and more difficult for Washington to shoulder this 
responsibility alone.  Along with this funding, developed nations must pursue 
trade policies that reinforce the alternative development initiatives.  Farmers who 
are willing to grow pineapple instead of coca should not be slapped with tariffs or 
non-tariff barriers that further discourage legal farming.  Given their past affinity 
for alternative development programs, international organizations and the 
European Union would seem to be ideal candidates to support such efforts in 
Colombia.  However, compared to Bolivia and Peru, alternative development 
investments in Colombia have been almost negligible and funneled 
predominantly through UN channels.  Up to 1996, international donors devoted 
only about $33 million to these projects.77
There are currently over 250 organizations, including governmental, 
private sector, finance industry, and international non-profit, that are involved in 
alternative development programs in Colombia.78  This would seem to indicate 
that alternative development holds a relatively high status within the international 
community.  The EU alone has been steadily increasing its financial support in 
Latin America from €425 million in 2001 to €609 million in 2003 in the name of 
 
77 Number taken from http://www.tni.org/archives/jelsma/altdel.htm, accessed 17 December 
2003. 
78 Directory of the organizations is listed on the Directory of Development Organizations 
website: http://www.devdir.org, accessed 17 December 2003. 
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sustainable economic and social development and the fight against poverty.79  
This chapter reviews the extent to which other nations individually, international 
organizations, and the European Union have provided managerial and monetary 
support to alternative development programs in Colombia and have implemented 
trade policies that guarantee access to markets for these crops. 
    
A. BILATERAL SUPPORT 
Colombia has received bilateral alternative development support from 
several countries over the past years, although the sums involved are small 
relative to the needs.  Bilateral support is expected to increase, as demonstrated 
by a 1999-2002 contribution of $15 million from the United States to co-finance 
licit income-generating activities in the opium and poppy growing areas.80  
Germany funds a rural development project in the Cauca region, and the 
European Commission supports an Amazon Basin Fund program.  The 
European Commission is furthermore expected to continue and extend a project, 
at present supported by the United Nations Drug Control Program, on a multi-
purpose satellite-based monitoring system to monitor coca growing regions and 
farmers involved in voluntary eradication programs.  This particular project is 
essential to the Office of the National Alternative Development Plan (PLANTE) to 
improve their currently deficient monitoring and evaluation of voluntary 
eradication programs as well as for the overall technical improvement of 
Colombia in the years ahead.  Direct responsibility for coordination and 
supervision of alternative development plans and projects in Colombia lies with 
PLANTE, which has at present twelve decentralized offices in illicit crop areas.  
Bilateral and regional trade agreements such as the Andean Community 
have made inroads toward improving the marketability of legal crops.  In addition, 
the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, encompassing North, Central 
 
79 Numbers taken from “EU’s External Assistance to Latin America, 2000-2003,” EU Online 
[home page on-line]; available from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/la/news/memo04_120.htm; Internet; accessed 09 
June 2004. 
80 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Losing Battle of Alternative 
Development in Colombia,” CSIS online [home page online]; available from 
http://www.csis.org/pubs/prospectus/01spring_rivero.htm; Internet; accessed 17 December 2003. 
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and South America, would open many new markets within the hemisphere to 
Colombia.  Although negotiations have been fraught with contention, 
endangering the 2005 deadline, bilateral partisanship is spreading solidarity 
among Latin American nations.  This is leading to a multitude of beneficial trade 
agreements that otherwise would have been unrealized.  Colombia and 
Venezuela were able to achieve completely liberalized trade with one another by 
1992.  Since 2000, Colombia has also entered into five different Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, with Great Britain, Peru, Cuba, Spain, and Chile.81  In 
addition, Colombia is negotiating a Preferential Trade Agreement with India, 
which would add to the $92 million in trade the two countries did in 2001.82  The 
Andean Community of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and Ecuador 
eliminated sixty-seven percent of tariff lines by 200183 and has agreed to create 
a common market by 2005 in addition to the Free Trade Agreement that already 
exists between the Community and MERCOSUR.  
International support for Colombia’s alternative development efforts is 
important to demonstrate a global commitment to the fight.  Whether the aid 
comes in the form of money or preferential trade agreements is unimportant 
compared to the overall effect. 
 
B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
International support is vital to success.  The Feldafing Declaration made 
this explicit:  “Being convinced that the potentials of alternative development 
have only partially been exploited we call on the international community to 
 
81 Ministerio de Comercio, Industria, y Turismo, República de Colombia, “Bilateral 
Investment Treatise,” Mincomercio Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.mincomercio.gov.co/VBeContent/NewsDetail.asp?ID=532&IDCompany=1; Internet; 
accessed 09 June 2004. 
82 Information taken from Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “India-Colombia Bilateral 
Relations,” MEAIndia Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://meaindia.nic.in/foreignrelation/colombia.htm; Internet; accessed 09 June 2004. 
83 Data taken from “Periodic Note on Integration and Trade in the Americas,” prepared by the 
Organization of American States’ Foreign Trade Information System website, 
www.sice.oas.org/geograph/westernh/idb2000.pdf, accessed 17 December 2003. 
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allocate more funds to alternative development.  Sustainable alternative 
development requires long-term measures.”84
The United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), working on behalf 
of the UN International Drug Control Program, has fostered an alternative 
development approach that raises prospects for better lives for farmers in drug-
producing areas.  Over the past ten years, UNOPS has managed alternative 
development projects valued at $118 million in ten drug-producing countries:  
Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand and Viet Nam.85  Its policies take into 
account the economic, social, political and legal aspects of illicit drug production, 
and aims to restore and sustain livelihoods and social stability.  Specialized 
project management for alternative development, supplied through UNOPS, aims 
to create new income-earning opportunities for the poor, mainly by assisting with 
the production of legal cash crops, such as coffee or cocoa.  UNOPS also assists 
communities in establishing local means to process, transport, and sell crops in 
an attempt to ensure livelihoods are sustainable after outside development 
assistance ends.  
The key element UNOPS has been unable to promote, however, is 
community involvement.  Farming associations and other organizations that are 
committed to the production of legal crops and that possess enough power to 
resist pressure from drug traffickers to participate in the underground economy, 
are a requisite to the success of such programs.  Associations must set their own 
goals to establish legitimacy, which UNOPS can only help achieve.  UNOPS 
does provide a broad range of assistance, such as agricultural extension and 
other advice to help farmers produce alternative crops; support in identifying 
crops that are in demand by international and local consumers; technical 
assistance in starting up crop-processing facilities; assistance in establishing 
credit systems that enable farming associations to grow, process, market and 
transport crops; instruction in business management and accounting; guidance in 
 
84 Feldafing Declaration, 3. 
85 All figures taken from UNOPS website at: http://www.undp.org/ops/aboutunops/index.html, 
accessed 16 December 2003. 
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packaging and marketing goods; and assistance in achieving other rural-
development objectives identified by the community, such as building schools 
and roads and constructing water supply and sewer systems.86
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) President Philip Emafo 
noted, “The drug problem is often seen primarily as a social problem, but our 
report shows that it also has serious economic consequences which impact on 
the overall development of a country. While social problems of drug abuse are 
felt in the developed countries, the major economic impact of the illicit drug trade 
is in the developing world.”87  Further, the annual report by the INCB finds that 
long-term economic development is simply not possible if a country has failed to 
implement an effective system of controlling drugs.  The INCB therefore urges 
the international community to help developing countries in their drug control 
efforts. 
The Inter-American Development Bank’s (IADB) involvement in alternative 
development in Colombia began in 1996 with a $150 million loan strictly for 
developing the rural areas that were targeted in eradication strategies.88  The 
four-year loan was the first of its type the IADB had ever issued, and the bank’s 
policymakers recognized the potential difficulties involved.  In addition, in January 
1999 the IADB began a program to improve the international competitiveness of 
Colombia’s farm system in light of the opening of the country’s economy.  The 
IADB delivered over $12 million to Colombia in 2000, of which 24 % went to 
reform and modernization of government institutions.  None of these funds, 
however, are specifically allocated for alternative development. 
The five-year 1999 international competitiveness program totaling $145 
million has two subprograms. The first, agricultural technology, supports the 
reorganization of agricultural production by developing new technologies through 
 
86 Information taken from UNOPS website at: 
http://www.undp.org/ops/aboutunops/index.html, accessed 16 December 2003. 
87 International Narcotics Control Board, “Annual Report-2002,” INCB Online[home page on-
line]; available from http://www.incb.org/e/index.htm; Internet; accessed 10 May 2003. 
88 Inter American Development Bank, “Colombia and the IDB,” IADB Online [home page 
online]; available from http://www.iadb.org/exr/country/eng/colombia/; Internet; accessed 09 June 
2004. 
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priority research programs of interest to the public and private sectors.  The 
second, agricultural health and quality, supports institutional reforms in the 
National Agricultural Protection System and was designed to introduce higher 
food quality measures.89  This is essential for access to EC markets. 
The World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Colombia 
includes a lending program of up to $ 3.3 billion through June 2006.90  Three 
priorities of the new CAS that was released in January 2003 are:  achieving rapid 
and sustainable growth; ensuring that all Colombians benefit from growth, 
particularly those living in poverty; and building an efficient, accountable and 
transparent government administration.  To promote sustainable growth, the CAS 
will support initiatives and operations in the following areas: fiscal reforms, 
including the tax system; economic policy aimed at reducing poverty and 
inequalities; financial sector policies to ensure the health and financial 
sustainability of the banking system and to foster capital markets development; 
infrastructure to foster competitiveness and improve services to the poor; private 
sector initiatives that will foster a favorable business environment; rural 
development, to increase productivity in the countryside, work opportunities and 
provision of social services to vulnerable groups, including rural diversification for 
those affected by the international coffee crisis; and environmental and natural 
resource management to ensure environmental sustainability.  Although 
alternative development is not specifically mentioned, the general economic 
growth and rural development measures should indirectly benefit the alternative 
development programs.  
Open markets and increased foreign investment should provide a boost to 
the growing Colombian economy.91  Colombian Finance Minister Alberto 
Carrasquilla announced in April 2004 that economic growth estimates had been 
 
89 IADB, “Agricultural Tech & Sanitary Services,” IADB Online [home page online]; available 
from http://www.iadb.org/exr/doc98/apr/CO1167E.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 December 2003. 
90 World Bank, “Memorandum of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the International Finance Corporation to the Executive Directors on a 
Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Republic of Colombia,” (World 
Bank, 24 December 2002), 9. 
91 Colombia’s average annual economic growth from 1990-2000 was 2.8 percent.  The 
Economist, “Pocket World in Figures,” 2003 edition, 126. 
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increased to 4%.  This is a rise from previous estimates of 3.3% and was 
attributed to improved security, low interest rates, and rising investment.92 
Despite these positive contributions from IADB and the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) requires economic policies, called Structural 
Adjustment Programs, that undermine the efforts of the Colombian government 
to improve the situation in the countryside.93  
As a part of its macro-economic improvements, IMF fiscal policies include 
downsizing the public sector, mainly through privatization, and reducing public 
sector spending.  The Colombian government had been attempting to regain 
physical and political control of the state, but these policies risk reducing its 
ability to provide basic needs to the population.  By cutting spending in these 
areas the government loses legitimacy in the eyes of the very people with whom 
it particularly needs to maintain trust.  The most vulnerable sectors, especially 
rural farmers, who would benefit from increased spending for social programs 
and alternative development funding, have felt the burden of these policies.  For 
example, Plan Colombia notes that when it opened its economy to foreign 
investments and trade during the 1990s, “the result was the loss of 700,000 
hectares (1.75 million acres) of agricultural production to imports during the 
decade, which in turn proved to be a critical blow to employment in the rural 
areas where Colombia’s conflict is mainly staged.” 94  The Plan blames this on 
the retardation of the expected modernization of agriculture, which it attributes to 
the violence related to drug trafficking.   
An additional disadvantage of receiving all of the loans from the World 
Bank and IMF is the increased debt incurred.  Once Colombia begins to realize 
 
92 Numbers in the previous two sentences taken from Vivianne C. Rodrigues, “Colombia’s 
Economy to Expand at Least 4% in 2004,” Bloomberg Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=apnPmpigZWg8&refer=latin_america
; Internet; accessed 16 June 2004. 
93 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Approves Three Year Extended Fund Facility for 
Colombia,” International Monetary Fund Online[home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1999/pr9963.htm; Internet; accessed 11 May 2003. 
94 United States Institute of Peace Library, “Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and 
the Strengthening of the State, section on “Promotion of Trade and Investment” USIP Online 
[home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/colombia/adddoc/plan_colombia_101999.html#approach; Internet; 
accessed 12 March 2003. 
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improvements in the countries economy and a reduction in the illicit drug 
industry, the repayment of the loans will become a new problem.  Proponents of 
the loans would argue that along with the improved economy would come 
increased GNP, but this money should be reinvested into Colombia to ensure 
continued success. 
 
C. EUROPEAN UNION 
The European Union has generally favorable trade policies in place for 
drug-producing countries like Colombia, but has not backed up its rhetorical 
support for alternative development with sufficient levels of financial assistance.  
In 2001, trade relations between the EU and the Andean Community amounted 
to about €16 billion, nearly double the amount in 1991.  Trade with the Andean 
Community currently represents 0.8% of the EU’s total trade, while the EU 
represents 14.1% to the Andean Community.  Primary production (raw materials) 
makes up 77% of Andean exports, while 85% of the EU’s exports are 
manufactured products.95  From 1990 to 2000, exports from the Andean 
Community to the European market grew by 60%.  The most recent figures 
available show that, due to the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), 90% of products exported by the Andean Community to the EU are 
exempt from custom duties.96
Much of this increased trade can be attributed to the GSP, which was 
designed to encourage access to the European market for exports from 
developing countries.  The European Union has granted Latin America 
preferential access conditions (exemption or reduction of tariffs) for all industrial 
products as well as numerous agricultural products.  Since 13 December 1990, 
the EU has granted special GSP preferences for those Andean countries 
committed to tackling drug production and trafficking (since 1995 for Venezuela).  
 
95 All figures and information in the preceding sentences were found on, 




                                           
The policy remained unchanged until 31 December 1994, when the EU 
presented a new regulatory "Multi-annual Scheme of Generalized System of 
Preferences," to the Andean countries for a ten-year period (1995-2004). 
After the GSP regulation covering the period between 1999 and 2001 
expired, the EU Council of Ministers agreed to renew the GSP on 10 December 
2001. This new regulation codifies in a single text many of the recent additions to 
the GSP regime, and includes exoneration for countries with a significant drug-
producing problem as well as Central American countries.  It is valid from 1 
January 2002 until 31 December 2004 and will most likely be renewed.97
The GSP and more specifically the GSP “drugs” (i.e., special agreement 
for those Andean countries committed to fighting drug cultivation) is a key 
element in trade relations between the EU and Colombia.  As a result of either 
MFN or GSP tariff rates, most exports from Colombia are exempt from custom 
duties.  The special GSP “drugs” in particular facilitates access to European 
markets, notably of alternative development products (e.g., coffee).  In this 
manner, trade policy contributes to the European Community’s (EC) 
development co-operation objective of promoting economic growth through crop 
substitution in drug-producing countries. To the extent that rural poverty is one of 
the root causes of conflict, the EC trade policy vis-à-vis Colombia also 
contributes to diffusing that country’s ongoing violence. 
The EU has laid out a policy supportive of alternative development in its 
“Colombia Country Strategy Paper”:  “There is no alternative to the Peace 
Process. There is no military solution which could lead to a lasting peace.”98  
Further, the EU identified four areas it considers critical to achieving this “lasting 
peace”:  social and economic development and combating poverty; alternative 
development; support for the reform of the judiciary sector; and support and 
promotion of human rights.99  To further these strategies, the EU allocated thirty 
million euros for alternative development in 2003.100  Considering the overall 
 
97 Ibid. 
98 European Union, “Colombia Country Strategy Paper,” (European Union: May 2002), 5. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid, 25. 
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value of the program was €105 million, this was a relatively large percentage.101  
However, the commitment by the EU in real money terms to alternative 
development continues to fall short of their rhetoric.  The U.S. support for 
alternative development is a similar percentage, but the absolute amount of 
assistance far exceeds that of the EU.  The Strategy Paper goes on to affirm 
continued EU involvement and encourages the international community to join it, 
stating, “It is clear that Colombia needs the continuous support of the 
international community to respond effectively to those challenges.”102  
International support for alternative development in Colombia appears to 
be genuine.  Bilateral agreements and favorable treatment in trade have laid 
some important groundwork for continued alternative development.  However, 
monetary support for alternative development continues to be deficient.  
Preferential trade agreements and the elimination of tariffs for counties battling 
drug problems are steps in the right direction.  The increased market access for 
farmers involved in voluntary eradication programs provides incentive for illicit 
farmers to follow suit.  However, the failure of the EU is seen in their support of 
the other necessary ingredients for successful alternative development.  The 
insufficient funding (i.e., only €30 million compared to $150 million from the U.S.) 
for improvements to social infrastructure and industrialization greatly reduce any 




102 Ibid, 17. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Colombia’s illicit drug industry has led the country into a downward spiral 
since the 1990s.  However, the gains made with Plan Colombia and the 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy have created the conditions for 
alternative development to contribute to the reduction of coca cultivation in 
Colombia.  Farmers have shown their willingness to participate in voluntary 
alternative development programs and forced eradication efforts have 
significantly reduced the amount of drugs being cultivated in a number of areas.  
These areas are prime candidates for increased alternative development 
programs. 
Chapter II found that alternative development is being utilized as part of 
the counter drug strategies of both the Colombian and U.S. administrations.  Plan 
Colombia initialized the push for alternative development, but grossly under 
funded the program, leading to failures that the USGAO noted.  These failures 
were caused by a number of factors that all indicated a weak state presence in 
the regions where the programs were being implemented.  The Bush 
administration launched the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), putting more stress 
and, more importantly, money into alternative development.  Moreover, the ARI 
provides aid to Colombia’s neighbors to help prevent coca production from 
shifting across the border.  At the same time, Colombian President Uribe 
introduced his Democratic Security and Defense Policy to reclaim the state for 
Colombians.  The emphasis was placed on reestablishing security in the state 
with particular focus on the rural areas where government presence is almost 
negligible.  However, alternative development was marginalized in the document 
and was not indicated as a vital piece the Colombian security puzzle. 
Chapter III showed that the U.S. and Colombian governments are 
attempting to address some of the necessary components that make alternative 
development programs successful.  The pronounced lack of security in remote 
rural regions, as evidenced by the increased presence of paramilitaries and 
insurgent groups, has been stemmed setting the stage for ingredients such as 
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improved infrastructure and monitoring procedures to take hold.  However, with 
the focus on eradication efforts and security within Colombia the gains in those 
areas cannot be used to their full potential.  Although this improved security will 
contribute to the receptiveness of farmers who can rely more on the government 
for protection against the armed actors, they are not being provided with enough 
alternative development assistance to consolidate reductions in coca production.  
More emphasis needs to be placed on giving farmers, who are now able to give 
up drug cultivation because of increased government presence in rural coca 
growing regions, a viable alternative.   
Chapter IV showed that the international community and the European 
Community have implemented favorable trade policies and provided financial 
support that Colombia needs for alternative development programs to succeed.  
The reduced or eliminated tariffs make markets more accessible for farmers 
involved in voluntary eradication programs.  Further, the bilateral agreements 
entered by Colombia ensure the markets will remain accessible.  While foreign 
markets are of major significance to Colombian farmers, the increased regional 
solidarity developed by the FTAA negotiations could create a powerful 
community of Latin American farmers.   
The financial support for alternative development programs from the 
international and European communities has been beneficial and will most likely 
see results if they can increase the level of support to equal or better that of the 
U.S.  The limited funds currently being committed have little impact on the many 
needs of Colombia noted in chapter III.  International organizations such as the 
World Bank, IMF, and IADB have provided money in the past in the name of 
alternative development and with the gains made in security and government 
presence their continued and increased funding for these programs becomes 
even more important.  The Colombian government must strike a delicate balance 
between the benefit of the additional money the loans provide and the detriment 
of the additional debt.  Any gains made by these loans could be severely reduced 
by the loss of government resources in paying off the loans in the long run. 
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The U.S. government has been focused on eradication programs as the 
primary means of fighting the drug industry.  The international community, in 
contrast, has espoused economic development as the main strategy in the war 
on drugs.  The Colombian government is understandably concentrating on 
internal security and increased state presence.  The coordination between these 
individual pursuits will lead to a genuine reduction of coca production and 
increased state legitimacy.  Eradication efforts cannot be marginalized, but 
should not continue to take center stage in the counter-narcotic strategies.  
Increasing the funding for alternative development programs in the wake of the 
continued success of eradication efforts is the most effective strategy for the U.S. 
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